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ABSTRACT

The use of research tools is critical for pharmaceutical companies to conduct
timely and efficient research in the development of new drugs. Traditionally, the use
of any patented inventions during drug development that is reasonably related to
submission of information to the Food and Drug Administration for regulatory review
has been protected under the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision. Recently, the
Federal Circuit narrowed the scope of the safe harbor provision excluding the use of
certain patented research tools. The effect of this decision on research tools may
negatively impact the public by raising the cost of pharmaceutical companies'
research and development programs, ultimately raising the cost of drugs available to
the public. Legislation specifically including the use of research tools within the safe
harbor, or alternatively, judicially supplementing this modern test for safe harbor
would resolve the uncertainty faced by pharmaceutical companies.
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INTRODUCTION
Historically, pharmaceutical companies have relied upon the protection accorded
by the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision to protect certain infringing activities
that facilitate the research and development of new drugs. 1 An alleged infringer
must satisfy a two-prong test for a court to grant the alleged infringer safe harbor
protection.2
First, the alleged infringer must make, use, offer to sell, or sell a
"patented invention." 3 Second, the alleged infringer's use of the "patented invention"
must be reasonably related to submissions to the Food and Drug Administration
4
("FDA') for regulatory approval.

The safe harbor provision represents a balance between two very important and
competing public interests. 5 The first interest is stimulating innovation through the

* J.D. Candidate, May 2010, The John Marshall Law School. B.S. Cellular and Molecular
Biology, The University of Michigan, April 2005. I would like to specifically thank Professor David
L. Schwartz, Professor Arthur Acevedo, Anshul Mangal, and Andrew Cook for their invaluable
assistance while I was writing my comment. I would also like to thank the staff of The John
Mars-hallReview of IntellectualProperty Lawfor their editorial assistance. Finally, I would like to
thank my family for their love and support.
I Brief for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 1-2, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No.
03-1237) [hereinafter Brief for PRMA, 2005 WL 429973, at *1-2.
2 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006); see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990)
(articulating the two prongs of the safe harbor provision: the "use of a patented invention" and the
"submi[ssion] [of] information for marketing approval of medical devices under the FDA.").
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within
the United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other
than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used
in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which
is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA,
hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic
manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
3 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
hid.
5 Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("These provisions of
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments 'emerged from Congress' efforts to balance two conflicting policy
objectives: to induce name brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary to
research and develop new drug products, while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring
cheaper, generic copies of those drugs to market."' (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991
(D.D.C. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting on other grounds))); H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 30 (1984)
("[T]he committee has merely done what the Congress has traditionally done in the area of
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patent system to encourage parties to expend resources and develop new
technologies. 6 The second interest is to allow rapid entry of low-cost drugs to the
7
market.
The research-intensive pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries8 play a
vital role for these competing interests because they are responsible for significant
medical advances through the development of new drugs and biomedical discoveries. 9
In turn, research and development programs are dependent on access and use of
patented research tools. 10
Research tools comprise the technology used by pharmaceutical companies to
identify potential drug candidates,11 component parts in drug products, or drug
products to treat patients. 12 Research tools include the full range of resources used

intellectual property law; balance the need to stimulate innovation against the goal of furthering the
public interest.").
6 H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 30.
7 Id. at 29 (discussing that the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision allows generic drugs to
enter the market faster, substantially benefiting the government and assisting in the reduction of
health care costs).
8 Brief of Amicus Curiae, Biotechnology Industry Organization, in Support of Neither
Petitioner Nor Respondent at 1 n.2, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005)
(No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 435887, at *1 n.2 ("The biotechnology industry has been one of the most
research-intensive industries in history."); Raj Bawa et al., Nanopharmaceuticals:PatentingIssues
and FDA Regulatory Challenges,SCITECH LAW., Fall 2008, at 10 (reporting that between 1975 and
2008, pharmaceutical research and development investment increased forty-fold from $1 billion to
$40 billion).
9 Brief of Amici Curiae Genentech, Inc. and Biogen Idec, Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 1-3, 22
n.10, Merck, 545 U.S. 193 (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 435893, at *1-3, *22 n.10 (reporting that amici
have developed breakthrough drugs and therapies for serious and life-threatening diseases
including asthma, multiple sclerosis, cancer, hepatitis B, and psoriasis having both used patented
research tools and invented, developed and patented new research tools); Brief for PRMA, supra
note 1, at 1 (reporting that the members of Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
are responsible for almost all of the innovative medicines in the United States and is a "[v]oluntary,
nonprofit association representing the nation's leading research-based pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies.").
10Soo, e.g., Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents,Liensing,Researoh Tools, and the
Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 148-49
(2004) (stating that research tools are necessary to develop products and services such as
pharmaceutical drugs); Thomas P. Noud & Paul T. Meiklejohn, The Developing Law of
PharmaceuticalPatent Enforcement, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 921, 962-63 (2005)
(noting that the research and development of "new drugs requires 'increasingly complex research
tools ..
"').
" FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To PROMOTE INNOVATION:
THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3 at 18 (2003) [hereinafter FTC Report], available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (discussing a narrow definition of research tools
as "a technology that is used by pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies to find, refine, or
otherwise design and identify a potential product or properties of a potential drug product.").
12 Janice M. Mueller, No "DilettanteAffair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to
Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2001) (noting that
depending on the perspective a research tool may be considered as an end product); David L. Parker,
Patent Infringement Exemptions for Life Science Research, 16 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 615, 617 (1994)
('Biotechnological discoveries thus serve dual roles as basic tools for further research and as applied
technology in more directly beneficial applications."); Jian Xiao, Carving Out a Biotechnology
Research Tool Exception to the Safe HarborProvision of 35 US. C. § 271 (E)(1), 12 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 23, 48 (2003) ("Even basic biological discoveries such as DNA sequences, cell lines, animal

[8:452 2009]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

in the laboratory such as: "cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal
models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry and DNA libraries, clones and
13
cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, laboratory equipment and machines.
It is unclear whether patented research tools used in drug development may be
protected under the safe harbor provision. 14 Uncertainty about whether the safe
harbor provision extended to research tools generated inconsistency in early case
law1 5 and interest among academics. 1 6 Recently, however, in Proveris Scientific
Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc.17 the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit modified the first prong of the safe harbor test.18 The first prong of the
Proveris test restricts the scope of "patented inventions" protected under the
models, or laboratory techniques used to create or identify these discoveries, might ultimately prove
to be therapeutic or diagnostic products in their own rights.").
13 Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on
Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,092 n. 1 (final
notice Dec. 23, 1999); see e.g., Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 872 n.4
(Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 545 U.S. 193 (2005) [hereinafter Integra 1] (discussing the National
Institute of Health's definition of research tools).
'> See, e.g., Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences
I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 205 n.7 (2005) ("We
therefore need not-and do not-express a view about whether, or to what extent, § 271(e)(1) exempts
from infringement the use of 'research tools' in the development of information for the regulatory
process.").
15 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. King Pharms., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d 621, 625 n.2 (D. Md.
2006) (finding that the "extension of the safe harbor to cover the use of these [research] tools is
warranted by the language of Merck and a plain reading of the statute."); Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed,
Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082, 1094-95 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that research using a binding
protein was protected under the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision); Classen Immunotherapies,
Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 381 F. Supp. 2d 452, 454, 456 (D. Md. 2005) (adopting a broad interpretation of
the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision to immunize a research tool for evaluating the safety of
vaccine administration schedules ); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95CV-8833 (RPP), 2001 WL 1512597, at *3-4, *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001) (applying a broad
interpretation of section 271(e)(1) to include research tools when it held that patented intermediates
used in early-stage drug discovery were exempt from infringement). But see Infigen, Inc. v.
Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 980-81 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (holding that alleged
infringers of cloning patents did not come within the scope of the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor
provision because the research tools patents did not cover "products" as specified under section
156(f).
16Henrik Holzapfel & Joshua D. Sarnoff, A Cross-Atlantic Dialog On Experimental Use and
Research Tools, 48 IDEA 123, 141 (2008) ("One district court has held that research tools should be
included within the scope of § 271(e)(1) ....
However, various commentators have argued that the
language of § 271(e)(1) is limited to patented inventions that are ...
potentially subject to
regulatory approval...."); Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, Research Too] Patents After
Integra v. Merck-Have They Reached a Safe Harbor2 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367,
409-11 (2008) (opining that the application of section 271(e)(1) to the use of patented research tools
is unclear and noting that some commentators have interpreted section 271(e)(1) narrowly and some
have interpreted it broadly to include the exemption of research tools); Xiao, supra note 12, at 54
(noting that research tool developers will be unsure about whether their innovations will be
protected by the patent system or under the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision of the HatchWaxman Act).
17 536 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
18 Compare id. at 1265-66 (holding that the phrase "patented invention" in the section
271(e)(1) safe harbor provision includes only inventions that fall within the meaning of the section
156(f) patent term extension provision), with Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665
(1990) (articulating that the phrase "patented invention" in the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor
provision includes all inventions).
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provision. It specifically excludes from protection under the section 271(e)(1) safe
harbor provision those patented research tools that are not "products" as defined in
the section 156(f) patent term extension provision. 19 As a result of the Proveris
decision, many pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies may face liability for
their use of patented research tools during the research and development of new
20
drugs.
This comment shows that the Proveris decision departed from broad
interpretations of the safe harbor provision.
Part I discusses the patent term
extension provision and safe harbor provision, which were enacted to remedy
unintended effects of the FDA regulatory review process.
Part I also provides
information about the judiciary's traditionally broad interpretation of the safe harbor
provision, and its shift to a narrow interpretation. Part II analyzes the current state
of the law regarding the safe harbor provision, and the implications of the Proveris
decision. Part I1 advocates that legislation is necessary to include certain research
tool patents among the exempted "products" under the first prong of the safe harbor
test, or alternatively that the Proveristest be judicially supplemented to immunize
the use of research tools that are inherent to the development of patented products.

I. BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution grants Congress broad power to enact legislation
to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.
...
21
The patent system
promotes this progress by offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited period of
time as incentive for their innovative efforts. 22 The limited period of time is known
as the patent term. 23 The patent term grants a patentee the right to exclude others
from "[miaking, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
24
United States or importing the invention into the United States" for twenty years.
In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act, also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. 25 The Hatch-Waxman Act includes the
section 156 patent term extension provision and the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor
provision. 26
The following section of this comment discusses the safe harbor

19Proveris,536 F.3d at 1265-66.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (mandating that unauthorized activities such as making,
using, offering to sell, or selling a patented invention during the term of the patent constitutes
infringement).
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."), Id. § 8, cl. 8
("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
22 Id. § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (granting a twenty year term to the "pantentee, his heirs or
20

assigns, the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States ... .
23 35 U.S.C. § 154.
24 Id.
25 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98

Stat. 21585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360c (2006); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282).

6 Id. at §§ 201-02.
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provision, the judiciary's broad interpretation of this provision, and the shift to a
narrow interpretation.
A. CongressEnacts the Safe HarborProvision
The FDA requires that certain drugs and products undergo regulatory approval
before market entry.27 Two patent term distortions developed from the regulatory
approval process: (1) a loss of financial benefit in the early years of the patent term
and (2) a continuation of the patentee's exclusive rights beyond the statutory twentyyear patent term. 28 Congress enacted two provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act to
remedy these distortions. 29 The patent term extension provision addresses the first
30
distortion and the safe harbor provision addresses the second distortion.

1. CongressEstablishesPatent Term Extension to Remedy the FirstDistortionof
the FDA RegulatoryApproval Process
The first distortion of the FDA regulatory approval process is a loss of financial
benefit in the early years of the patent term. 31 Regulatory review by the FDA
requires extensive investigation of new drugs and products to ensure their safety and
efficacy before approval. 32 Most of the testing required for FDA approval is initiated
after a patent is issued, 33 and the process may take seven to ten years. 34 As a result
of the prolonged approval process, the twenty-year patent term may be shortened by
seven to ten years.3 5 The FDA review period and the de facto shortened term leads to
a potential loss of financial revenue.3 6 For example, if it takes Company X ten years
to receive regulatory approval for its patented drug, only ten years of the twenty-year
patent term remain when the drug enters the market. This ten-year loss of market
exclusivity reduces Company X's ability to derive profit from its innovation prior to
regulatory approval.

U.S.C. § 355(a).
Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669-70 (1990).
29Id. at 670; H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 5-6, 29-30 (1984).
30 EliLilly, 496 U.S. at 670-71; H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 21, 26-27.
31 Eli Lilly 496 U.S. at 669.
'32 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (g) (requiring approval of all new drugs pursuant to application filing
27 21

28 Eli

contents such as full reports of investigations to show whether or not a drug candidate is safe for use
and is effective in use).
33Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 669-70.
34 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by
statute, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360c; 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2006)),
as recognized in Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("A
recent study indicated that it now can take on average from 7 to 10 years for a pharmaceutical
company to satisfy the current regulatory requirements." (citing NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ENGINEERING, THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 79-80 (1983))).
35 Id.
36

Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 669-70.
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Congress enacted the section 156 patent term extension provision as part of the
Hatch-Waxman Act to remedy this first distortion. 37 When certain products are
patented before the regulatory review period is initiated, this provision adds up to
five additional years to the patent term.38 The length of the extension is determined
based upon the time necessary for FDA regulatory review.3 9 The products eligible for
patent term extension include: drug products, medical devices, food additives, or
color additives subject to regulation under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
("FDCA").40

2. CongressEstablishes the Safe HarborProvision to Remedy the Second Distortion
of the FDA RegulatoryApproval Process
The second distortion of the FDA regulatory approval process is a continuation
of the patentee's exclusive rights beyond the statutory twenty-year patent term. 41
During the twenty-year patent term, the patentee has the exclusive right to
manufacture, use, or sell the patented invention. 42 Competitors are prohibited from
making, using, or selling the patented invention until the patent term expires. 43 This
allows competitors such as pharmaceutical companies to benefit from the expired
patent to manufacture, use, or sell their own new or generic drugs. Pharmaceutical
companies, in order to market or sell new or generic drugs, however, must conduct
rigorous testing and must comply with FDA regulations. 44 The testing and FDA
regulatory review period can last many years, and thereby creates a de facto
45
continuation of the patentee's exclusive rights beyond the twenty-year term.
Congress included the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision in the HatchWaxman Act to remedy this second distortion. 46 The provision confers immunity to
researchers to initiate testing and FDA regulatory review of products that use the
patented invention prior to patent expiration. 47 This provision gives competitors the
48
ability to enter the market upon patent expiration.
49
Although provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act addressed the dual distortions,
the Act failed to specifically address research tools. Research tools are neither
expressly included nor excluded as products under the section 156(f) patent term
extension provision. 50 Additionally, the language of the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor
'37Id. at 670; H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 5-6, 21 (1984) (proposing the addition of section
156 to Title 35 to extend the patent term).
38 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 671; see also 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006).
3935 U.S.C. § 156(c).
40 35 U.S.C. § 156(f).
41 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 670.
42 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2).
43

35 U.S.C. § 271(a).

21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(b), (g) (2006).
45 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 670.
46 Id. at 671; H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 26 (1984) (proposing a new subsection (e) to section
35 U.S.C. § 271).
47 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); EliLily,496 U.S. at 671.
48 See Eli Liy, 496 U.S. at 671.
4 Id. at 670-71; H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 5-6, 21, 26-27, 29-30.
50 See 35 U.S.C. § 156(f).
44
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provision is ambiguous as to whether research tools qualify for immunity. 51 Due to
the ambiguous nature of the statute, judicial challenges to the scope of the safe
52
harbor provision reached the Supreme Court for interpretation.

B. The Supreme CourtBroadlyInterpretsSection 271(e)(1) to Include Medical
Devices & Preclinical Research
The Supreme Court has addressed the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision on
two occasions. 53 The Supreme Court broadly interpreted the safe harbor provision in
55
54
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. and Merck KGaA v. IntegraLifesciences I, Ltd.
In Eli Lilly, the Court included medical devices within the scope of the safe harbor
provision. 56 In Merck, the Court extended the protection under this provision to
57
preclinical research activities.

1. The Supreme Court GrantsSafe Harbor to Medical Devices in Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc.
The Supreme Court first addressed the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision in
Eli Lilly.58 Eli Lilly filed suit against Medtronic to enjoin Medtronic from testing and

marketing its alleged infringing medical device. 59 Medtronic argued that its
activities were exempt from infringement under the safe harbor provision. 60 To
qualify for protection under the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision, (1) a
plaintiffs product must qualify as a "patented invention;" and (2) the defendant's
alleged infringing use of that product must be "reasonably related to the development
and submission of information" for regulatory review. 61 Therefore, to obtain safe
harbor protection, Medtronic asserted that its medical device was a "patented
62
invention," and its use of the device was for regulatory review.
The Supreme Court determined that the phrase "patented invention" in the
provision included all inventions unless otherwise specified. 63 Accordingly, the Court
51See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 679 ("No interpretation we have been able to
imagine can transform § 271(e)(1) into an elegant piece of statutory draftsmanship.").
52 See

Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 195 (2005); Eli Lilly, 496 U.S.

at 663-64.

Merck, 545 U.S. at 195; Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 663-64.
, 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
5,545 U.S. 193 (2005).
6 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 664-65, 679.
57Merck, 545 U.S. at 208.
58 See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 664-65. (granting certiorari to determine whether the section
271(e)(1) safe harbor provision "exempts from infringement the use of patented inventions to
develop and submit information for marketing approval of medical devices under the FDCA.").
59 Id. at 664.
53

G0Jd

(3135 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
(32See
(

Eli Lily,496 U.S. at 664.
EliLilly,496 U.S. at 665 ("The phrase 'patented invention' in § 271(e)(1) is defined to include

all inventions, not drug-related inventions alone." (citing 35 U.S.C. § 100(a))). Section 100(a) states,
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found that a medical device was a "patented invention" 64 even though the safe harbor
provision does not expressly mention medical devices.6 5 Therefore, the Court found
that Medtronic's activities must be granted safe harbor protection if its use of the
medical device was reasonably related to the development and submission of
66
information for regulatory approval.
Additionally, the Court, in dicta, noted that the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor
provision and the section 156(f) patent term extension provision of the HatchWaxman Act were meant to be complimentary. 67 It found that all of the products
eligible for patent term extension under section 156(f) were protected under section
271(e)(1), creating a "perfect product fit" between the sections. 68 This argument was
69
later used by the Federal Circuit to narrow the scope of the safe harbor provision.
The Court ultimately broadened the scope of the safe harbor provision by
including any invention within the definition of a "patented invention" and not
limiting it solely to drug inventions.70
Therefore, the Supreme Court's broad
interpretation of the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision provided the basis for the
argument that research tools are "patented inventions" that fall within the scope of
the statute.7 1 After Eli Lilly, the Supreme Court did not address the section 271(e)(1)
issue again for 15 years until its decision Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I,
2
Ltd7

2. The Supreme Court GrantsSafe Harborto Preclinica]Research Activities in
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.
The Supreme Court addressed the scope of the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor
provision for a second time in Merck.73 The issue before the Court was whether

"When used in this title unless the context otherwise indicates--(a) [the term 'invention' means
invention or discovery." 35 U.S.C. § 100(a).
6 See EliLilly, 496 U.S. at 664, 679.
(3 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
(36Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 664, 679.
67 Id. at 672-74.
(38Id. at 673-74 (discussing that the products eligible for patent term extension under section
156(f) are subject to exemption under the safe harbor provision because they are subject to premarket approval under various provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). Medical devices,
food additives, color additives, new drugs, and human biological products are eligible for patent term
extension under section 156(f). Id. at 674. Medical devices are subject to pre-market approval under
21 U.S.C. § 360e. 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2006). Food additives are subject to pre-market approval under
section 348. 21 U.S.C. § 348. Color additives are subject to pre-market approval under section 379e.
21 U.S.C. § 379e. New drugs are subject to pre-market approval under section 355. 21 U.S.C. § 355.
Human biological products are subject to pre-market approval under 42 U.S.C. § 262. 42 U.S.C.
§ 262 (2006).
(39Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1262-63, 1265-66 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
70 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 665.
71 See Proveris, 536 F.3d at 1264 ('Innova contends that both Lilly and Merck support its
position and that the safe harbor provision should not be limited so as to exclude research toolsassuming its OSA device is viewed as such.").
72 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
73 See id. at 195.

[8:452 2009]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

preclinical research, early stage research conducted prior to human testing, satisfied
4
the second prong of the safe harbor test.'
Integra owned biotechnology patents on a short tri-peptide sequence ("RGD
peptides")75 Integra alleged patent infringement against Merck.7 6 Merck claimed
that its preclinical studies using Integra's RGD patents were protected under the
safe harbor provision.7 7 At trial, the jury did not grant Merck safe harbor protection,
78
and found Merck liable for patent infringement.
In a split decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court decision that
79
Merck's infringing activities were not protected under the safe harbor provision.
The Federal Circuit held that the preclinical activities were general biomedical
research used to identify new pharmaceutical compounds and were not reasonably
related to regulatory approval.80 In finding that the preclinical activities infringed
Integra's patents, the court characterized these patents as research tools.8 1 It merely
cautioned that a broad interpretation of this provision to protect the use of patented
research tools in preclinical activities would "effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of
patentees owning biotechnology tool patents."8 2
Judge Newman, dissenting,
identified the RGD technology as "new compositions having certain biological
properties" rather than as a research tool.8 3 Judge Newman argued that "discovery84
based research" activities should be granted safe harbor.
Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit's decision.8 5 The
Court broadened the scope of the safe harbor provision for a second time by including
preclinical studies 8of6 patented compounds within the definition of the phrase
"reasonably related." The Court determined that the use of a patented invention in
experiments that were not included in a submission of information to the FDA was
87
not a categorically infringing use and did not exclude their use from safe harbor.
The Court remanded the case to the Federal Circuit to determine whether the
88
preclinical activities were "reasonably related" to the regulatory approval process.
74Id. at 202-03.
75Id. at 197 (stating that Integra's five patents related to the tripeptide (amino acid) sequence

Arg-Gly-Asp, which is referred to as the "RGD peptide").
70Gd. at 200.
77 Id.
78 Id.at

201.

79Integra IT 331 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vaeatod, 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
80 Id.at

81

866.

Id. at 871-72.

82 Id. at 867. Under a broad interpretation of the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision, the
use of research tools in clinical testing for FDA approval would fall within the safe harbor, leaving
the only commercial value of research tools in general research. Id. The majority asserted that
including preclinical research within the scope of the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision would
"swallow the whole benefit of the Patent Act for some categories of biotechnological inventions." Id.
83 Id.at 878 (Newman, J., concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part).
84 See id.at 873 (Newman, J., concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part).
85 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005).
86 Id.at 206-08. The section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision allows researchers to experiment
and to fail during development of drugs for regulatory approval when there is a reasonable basis for
believing that a patented compound may be appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA. Id.
at 207.
87 Id
88 Id.at 208.
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Furthermore, the Court specifically declined to address the issue of whether research
9
tools fall within the protected scope of the safe harbor provision.8
On remand, the Federal Circuit held that the preclinical research activities were
exempt under the safe harbor provision because the experiments were "reasonably
related" to regulatory review. 90 Again, the majority expressly declined to determine
whether the safe harbor extends to the use of research tools. 91 In dissent, however,
Judge Rader addressed research tools and warned that the majority opinion would
have a "devastating impact on research tool inventions" because it implicitly grants
these tools immunity under the safe harbor provision. 92
Without explicitly
addressing research tools, the Supreme Court's decision in Merck broadened the safe
harbor provision. 93 The analysis below shows that after this decision, several district
courts applied the safe harbor provision to research tools.

B. Several District CourtsFound that Researeh Tools Fall Within the Safe Harbor
Provision
Without definitive guidance on whether research tools fall within the scope of
the safe harbor provision, several district courts applied it to research tools. 94 For
example, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulene Rorer, Inc., 95 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted safe harbor
protection to research tools. 96 Rhone-Poulenc Rorer ("RPR") filed suit against BristolMyers Squibb Company's ("Bristol") for use of RPR's patented chemical
intermediates in Bristol's research and development program. 97
The court
determined that Bristol's use of RPR's patented intermediates in drug discovery was
98
exempt from infringement under the safe harbor provision.
Additionally, in Classen Imm unotherapies, Inc. v. King Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 99
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland conferred safe harbor to
research tools. 100
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. ("Classen") developed a new
research tool and patented it as a "method[] for identifying and commercializing new
uses for existing drugs." 10 1
Classen brought suit against Elan for patent
89 Id. at 205 n.7.
90 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 496 F.3d 1334, 1348 (Fed. Cir 2007) [hereinafter

Integra I1.
91 Id. at 1348.
92 See id. at 1350. (Rader, J. dissenting-in-part and concurring- in-part).
93 Merck, 545 U.S. at 207 n.7, 208 (declining to address the issue of research tools and holding
that preclinical research may fall within the scope of the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision).
94 See, e.g., Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. King Pharms., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d 621, 625 n.2
(D. Md. 2006) (granting safe harbor protection to research tools).
9 No. 95-CV-8833 (RPP), 2001 WL 1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001).
96 See id. at *8.
97 Id. at *1.
98 Id. at *8.

99 466 F. Supp. 2d 621 (D. Md. 2006).

100 See id. at 625 n.2 ("Although the Classen process could be considered a 'research tool' the
Court finds extension of the safe harbor to cover the use of these tools warranted by the language of
Merck and a plain reading of the statute.").
101 See id. at 623.
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infringement. 102 Classen alleged that Elan infringed its patented research tools
when Elan: (1) studied the effect of food on the drug Skelaxin (a muscle relaxant); (2)
used the study to identify new uses for Skelaxin; and (3) filed a new drug application
for regulatory review with the FDA in order to commercialize its new use. 103 The
district court determined these activities were protected under the safe harbor
provision.104
As noted above, the Bristol-Myers and Classen courts found that research tools
fall under the scope of the safe harbor provision.10 5 In 2008, however, the Federal
10 6
Circuit determined that research tools do not fall under the safe harbor provision.

C The Federal CircuitNarrows the Scope of the Section 271(e)(1) Safe Harbor
Provision
The scope of the safe harbor provision was recently narrowed in Proveris
Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc.10 7 Proveris alleged patent infringement
against Innovasystems, Inc. ("Innova") for making and selling a device known as the
Optical Spray Analyzer ("OSA").108 The alleged infringing OSA device was not
subject to regulatory review by the FDA,109 but was only sold to the FDA and
pharmaceutical companies. 110 The device was used exclusively as a research tool to
conduct experiments for FDA regulatory submissions.1 11 Innova asserted that its
activities were exempt from liability by the safe harbor provision because it satisfied
the Eli LlJly two-prong test: (1) Proveris' patent is a "patented invention;" and (2)
11 2
Innova's alleged infringing device was only used for regulatory submissions.
The Federal Circuit did not grant Innova safe harbor protection. 113 The court
first questioned whether all patented inventions should qualify for safe harbor under
the first prong of the Eli Lilly test. 114 It stated that the first prong of the Eli Lilly
test does not apply to all patented inventions.1 1 5 The court referred back to the
narrow approach articulated in Eli Lily that interpreted the section 271(e)(1) safe
102

103

Id. at 623.
Id. at 624.

101Id. at 625.
1051
Id. at 625 n.2; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95-CV-8833
(RPP), 2001 WL 1512597, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001).
106 See Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1265-66 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (holding that the safe harbor provision does not protect the OSA device from infringement).
107 Id. at 1263-66.
'(8 Id. at 1259.
109
110

Id.
Id. at 1264.

11 See id. at 1259 (stating that the OSA device "measures the physical parameters of aerosol
sprays used in nasal spray drug delivery devices."). Inhaler-based drug delivery devices require
FDA regulatory approval. Id. at 1258.
112 Id. at 1259-60.
113 Id. at 1266.

114 See id. at 1261-63.
115 See id. at 1265-66 (finding that the Supreme Court interpreted the section 271(e)(1) safe

harbor provision to include at least "all inventions" within the section 156 patent term extension
provision based upon the Supreme Court's symmetry analysis between sections 271(e)(1) and 156(f),
and the roughly offsetting patent distortions these sections were designed to eliminate).
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harbor provision and the section 156(f) patent term extension provision as
116
complimentary provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
The section 156(f) patent term extension provision was enacted to remedy the
first distortion-the adverse affect caused by lengthy regulatory review.1 17 The
patent term extension provision applies to "products" that have been subject to
regulatory review. 118 In Proveris,the court stated that the patented device was not
subject to FDA regulatory review, and was therefore not a "product" under the patent
term extension provision.1 19 The court also noted that the alleged infringing OSA
device was not subject to FDA regulatory review, and was therefore not adversely
affected by the second distortion-the regulatory barriers that extend the patent
term. 120 As a result, the court stated, "we do not think Congress could have intended
that the safe harbor of section 271(e)(1) apply to it."121 Accordingly, the court
determined that the first prong of the safe harbor provision test only applies to
patented inventions that are "products" as defined in the patent term extension
22
provision.
This determination narrowed the scope of the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor
provision. 23 It modified the first prong of the Eli Lilly test from "all patented
inventions" to only "products" defined in the patent term extension. 24 The Proveris
decision set forth the modern test to determine whether an invention is a "product,"
and therefore subject to safe harbor protection. The analysis section of this comment
will focus on the implications of Proverison research tools.

II. ANALYSIS
The Federal Circuit's decision in Proverisnarrowed the scope of section 271(e)(1)
safe harbor protection. 125 After Prove-ris,to qualify for safe harbor protection, (1) the
patented invention, itself, must be subject to FDA regulatory review as a "product"
defined in the patent term extension provision, and (2) the use of the patented
invention must be "reasonably related" to regulatory review. 126 The following section
of this comment first focuses on how this test applies to research tools. Next, this
section examines the distinction between the research tools that qualify for safe
harbor under the Proveristest and those that do not. Finally, this section addresses
the inconsistency in the application of the Proveristest to research tools.

6

11

Id. at 1262-63.

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 670 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at
5-6, 21 (1984) (proposing the addition of section 156 to Title 35 to extend the patent term).
11835 U.S.C. § 156(f) (2006).
119 Proveris, 536 F.3d at 1265-66.
117

120

Id.

Id. at 1265.
See id.at 1265-66.

121

122
123

See id. at 1263-66 (narrowing the safe harbor provision despite its previously broad
application of section 271(e)(1)).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1265-66.
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A. Proveris Narrows the 'PatentedInventions" that Qualify for Safe Harbor
The Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor
provision in Eli Lilly and Merck suggested that the use of patented research tools for
FDA regulatory review can be used as an affirmative defense to patent
infringement. 127 In Proveris, however, the Federal Circuit narrowed the scope of the
128
safe harbor provision, effectively precluding research tools from immunity.
After Proveris,the first prong of the safe harbor test mandates that the patented
invention be subject to FDA regulatory approval, and must be a "product" as the term
is defined in the section 156(f) patent term extension provision. 129 The four products
that qualify for patent term extension are: (1)drug products, (2) medical devices, (3)
food additives, and (4) color additives. 130 Therefore, in order for a patented research
tool to qualify for safe harbor, it must qualify as one of these four products under the
patent term extension provision, and its use must be reasonably related to regulatory
review.131 The analysis below gives examples of research tools that are eliminated
from safe harbor protection, and research tools that may qualify for safe harbor
under the first prong of the Proveristest.

1. No Safe Harborfor Research Tools That Are Used to Identify and Design
PotentialDrugProducts
The first prong of the Proveris test for "patented inventions" categorically
eliminates safe harbor protection for research tool patents that are used to identify
and design potential drug products such as: cloning techniques, databases, computer
software, and laboratory equipment such as microscopes, analytical balances, and
computers. 132 These tools do not satisfy the Proveris test because they are not
127 Soe Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005) (reaffirming the
Eli Lilly holding that defined "patented invention" to include "all uses of patented inventions that
are reasonably related to the development and submission of any information under the FDCA.");
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronie, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990) ("The phrase 'patented invention' in
§ 271(e)(1) is defined to include all inventions, not drug-related inventions alone.").
128 See Proveris, 536 F.3d at 1263-66 (defining the phrase "patented invention" to mean all
inventions within section 156(f) and holding that the safe harbor provision does not protect the OSA
device from infringement).
129 Proveris,536 F.3d at 1265-66.
130 35 U.S.C. § 156(0 (2006).
A "drug product" is the active ingredient of "a new drug,
antibiotic drug, or human biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act) ....
" 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)(2). A "biological product"
is "a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative,
allergenic product, or analogous product, or arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any
other trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a
disease or condition of human beings." 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2006). A "medical device" within the
meaning of section 156(f) is a class III device. 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2006). A class III device is a device
that is "purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use
which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health, or presents a
potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(J)-(II).
131 See Proveris, 536 F.3d at 1265-66.
132 See id. (determining that the phrase "patented invention" for the purposes of the section
271(e)(1) safe harbor provision is limited to inventions stated in the section 156(f) patent term

[8:452 2009]

The Precarious State of Research Tools

products that require FDA regulatory approval and thus do not meet the first prong
of the Eli Lilly test. 133 Eliminating these types of research tools from protection
under the safe harbor provision is consistent with the policy considerations leading to
the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 134 Indeed, for these tools, the Proveristest
prevents a patentee from invoking safe harbor protections when his invention is not
subject to regulatory restrictions that reduce the patent term prior to market
135
entry.

2. No Safe Harborfor Research Tools That are IncorporatedInto Qualifying Drug
Productsand are Analogous to cProducts" Under the Patent Term Extension
The first prong of the Proveris test for "patented inventions" eliminates safe
harbor protection for certain research tools incorporated into drug products that are
subject to FDA regulatory approval. 136 According to Proveristhese inventions do not
satisfy the first prong of the Eli Lilly test for "patented inventions" because they are
not "products" within the definition of the patent term extension provision, and are
therefore not subject to FDA regulatory review. 13 7 For example, the use of patented
chemical precursors in the research and development of new drugs that require FDA
regulatory approval would not be granted safe harbor protection.
Bristol-Myers, decided before Proveris,illustrates this point. In Bristol-Myers,
Bristol embarked on a research and development program to discover a new, more
active anticancer drug. 13 8 It wanted to replace the drug Taxol, the leading anticancer
drug, before its patent on Taxol expired.13 9 Bristol used patented chemical
intermediates as research tools in testing and screening to develop a new and more
effective drug to replace Taxol. 140 Taxol's replacement drug would be subject to FDA
regulatory approval.141
The district court determined that Bristol's unauthorized use of the patented
intermediates was protected by the safe harbor provision because it met the first and
second prong of the Eli Lilly test. 142 Specifically, the court determined that a
extension provision). Laboratory equipment, cloning techniques (such as PCR), databases, and
computer software do not require FDA premarket approval and are not "products" within the
meaning of section 156(f). See 35 U.S.C. § 156(f) (defining the term "product").
133 See Proveris, 536 F.3d at 1265-66.
131See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669 (1990) (stating that the HatchWaxman Act was "designed to respond to two unintended distortions of the 17-year patent term
produced by the requirement that certain products must receive premarket regulatory approval.");
H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15 (1984) ("The purpose of Title II of the Bill is to create a new
incentive for increased expenditures for research and development of certain products which are
subject to premarket government approval.").
135See Proveris,536 F.3d at 1265-66.
136 See id.
137 See id
138
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95CV8833 (RPP), 2001 WL
1512597, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001).
139

Id.

140 Id.

141 Id. at *5.
142 Soo id.at *2,*6 (concluding that the phrase "patented invention" applies to all inventions
and holding that Bristol's experiments with the patented chemical intermediates were protected by
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patented research tool falls under the broad scope of "all patented inventions" and is
protected by the safe harbor provision. 143 Under the Proverisstandard, however, the
use of patented chemical intermediates is not protected under the first prong of the
safe harbor provision because these intermediates are not "products" within the
144
meaning of the patent term extension provision.
The final drug product that incorporates a research tool, such as the chemical
intermediates in Bristol-Myers, is a "product" under the patent term extension
provision, and therefore is subject to FDA regulatory approval. 145 Even though the
chemical intermediates are not "products" under the patent term extension
provision,1 46 these research tools should be considered "products" because they
become an inseparable component of a drug product that is subject to FDA
regulation. 147 These research tools, however, do not qualify for safe harbor under the
first prong of the Proveristest because they are not explicitly listed as "products" in
the patent term extension provision.

3. Safe Harborfor Research Tools That Qualify as "Products"Under the Patent
Term Extension
The facts of Merck, decided before Proveris,illustrate how the use of a patented
research tool may be granted safe harbor protection under the first prong of the
Proveristest. In Merck, scientists conducted preclinical experiments to evaluate the
the safe harbor provision because those experiments were "reasonably related" to regulatory
review).
143 Id. at *2.
Nothing in the text of Section 271(e)(1) indicates that Congress intended to
restrict the scope of the term "patented invention" to those products covered by Section 156. As the

U.S. Supreme Court noted,
'The term patented invention is 271(e)(1) is defined to include all inventions, not
drug-related inventions alone. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (when used in this title
unless the context otherwise indicates ... the term "invention" means invention
or discovery.').
[d.(quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v.Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990)).
In its determination that the phrase "patented invention" means "all patented inventions," the
district court relied upon two Federal Circuit decisions that applied a broad interpretation of the
safe harbor provision and granted immunity to alleged infringing patented inventions that are not
"products" within the section 156(f) patent term extension provision. Id. In Abtox, the Federal
Circuit held that the safe harbor provision applied even though the alleged infringing Class II device
was not eligible for patent extension under section 156(1). Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d
1019, 1028-30 (Fed. Cir. 1997), amended by 131 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Furthermore, in
Chartex,the Federal Circuit stated, '[a]lthough section 156 and section 271(e)(1) of title 35 passed
Congress .... this Court declines to read possible limitations from one section into another."
Chartex Int'l PLC v. M.D. Pers. Prod. Corp., No. 92-1556, 1993 WL 306169, at *5 n.2 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
12, 1993) (reported in table at 5 F.3d 1505).
144 See 35 U.S.C. § 156(f) (2006) (stating that products include: drug products, medical devices,
food additives, or color additives that require regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act); Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1265-66 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
145 See 35 U.S.C. § 156(f).
146 See

id.

See id.; ef Bristol-Meyers, 2001 WL 1512597, at *5 (discussing the creation of a second
generation drug product by incorporating structural changes through chemical modification).
147
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suitability of RGD peptides as potential drug candidates. 148
The experiments
"measured the efficacy, specificity, and toxicity" of the potential drug candidates to
determine which drugs were effective and safe enough to warrant testing in
humans. 149 One of the RGD peptides was chosen to undergo regulatory review as the
active ingredient in the drug product. 150 Under the Proveris test, these activities
may be protected under the safe harbor provision because the RGD peptides are
151
biological products within the meaning of the patent term extension provision.
152
These products qualify for safe harbor under the first prong of the Proveristest.

B. InconsistenciesBetween the ProverisTest as applied to Merck and Bristol-Myers
There is an inconsistency in the applicability of the safe harbor provision when
the first prong of the Proveristest is applied to the facts of Bristol-Myers and Merck.
Although the use of the patented RGD peptides in Merck and the chemical
precursors in Bristol-Myers are analogous, 153 the Proveris test creates a distinction
between the two uses. 154 Both the RGD peptides and the chemical precursors played
a dual role as research tools to: (1) screen, identify, and develop new drugs, and (2)
potentially become components of the final drug products. 155 The final drug products
15 6
are subject to FDA regulatory approval.
Under the first prong of the Proveris test, the RGD peptides in Merck are
"products" under the patent term extension provision and may qualify for safe harbor
protection. 157 The chemical precursors in Bristol-Myers, however, are not "products"
118

Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 198 (2005).

149

Id. at 198-99.

150 Soo id.

151See 35 U.S.C. § 156(f) (defining drug product to include biological products); Proveris
Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1265-66 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
152 Soe 35 U.S.C. § 156(f) (defining drug product to include biological products); Proveris, 536
F.3d at 1265-66.
153 Compare Merck, 545 U.S. at 198-99 (discussing the testing and evaluating of RGD peptides
to identify a potential drug candidate), with Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulene Rorer, Inc.,
No. 95-CV-8833 (RPP), 2001 WL 1512597, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001) (discussing
experimentation with patented intermediates to identify a potential drug candidate).
154 See Proveris, 536 F.3d at 1265-66 (eliminating safe harbor protection for "all patented
inventions" and requiring that "patented inventions" are "products" within the patent term

extension provision).
155 See Merck, 545 U.S. at 198-99 (discussing the screening, testing, and evaluating of RGD
peptides to identify a potential drug candidate and initiating "a formal project to guide one of its
RGD peptides through the regulatory approval process in the United States and Europe."); BristolMyers, 2001 WL 1512597, at *4-5 (experimenting with patented intermediates to identify a
potential drug candidate and preparing derivatives of Taxol by chemical modification to develop a
new drug).
156 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
157 35 U.S.C. § 156(f) (including biological products within the definition of a "drug product");
42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2006) (defining "biological product" as "a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin,
antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, or analogous product, or
arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic compound),
applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings."); see
Proveris, 536 F.3d at 1265-66 (defining the phrase "patented invention" within the safe harbor
provision to include only "products" stated in the patent term extension provision).
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under the patent term extension provision and do not qualify for safe harbor
protection. 15S Thus, when a patented research tool is a component of a drug product,
the first prong of the Proveristest does not provide consistency between analogous
uses. The first prong of the Proveristest requires that the research tool qualify as a
"product" under the patent term extension provision regardless of whether the
159
ultimate drug product undergoes FDA regulatory approval.
Additionally, this distinction is contrary to the policy considerations leading to
the enactment of the safe harbor provision in the Hatch-Waxman Act because the
final drug product that incorporates these research tools is subject regulatory
review. 160 These regulatory restrictions reduce the patent term prior to market
entry.161

This subsection identified the inconsistencies created by Proveris. The next
subsection addresses the effect of this decision on research tool patent holders and
pharmaceutical companies.

C. Uncertaintyand Consequencesfor PharmaceuticalCompaniesAfter a Narrow
Interpretationof the Section 271 (e)(1) Safe HarborProvisionEffectively Excludes
Research Tools
After Proveris, pharmaceutical companies may face increased research and
development costs and the uncertainty of litigation because research tool patent
holders can enforce their rights against companies that use the research tool patents
to obtain FDA regulatory approval.1 62 While the effects of Proveris remain to be
seen, the analysis below shows that the shift in the Federal Circuit's construction of
the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision has tipped the balance between the public
158 35 U.S.C. § 156(0 (including drug products, medical devices, food additives, and color
additives that undergo regulatory review among the "products" within the patent term extension);
see Proveris,536 F.3d at 1265-66 (defining the phrase "patented invention" within the safe harbor
provision to include only "products" stated in the patent term extension provision).
159 See Pr vc ris, 536 F.3d at 1265-66 (defining the phrase "patented invention" within the safe
harbor provision to include only "products" stated in the patent term extension provision).
160 21 U.S.C. § 355(a); H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 29-30 (1984).
161 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1984), supersededby
statute, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360c; 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282), as
recognized in Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("A
recent study indicated that it now can take on average from 7 to 10 years for a pharmaceutical
company to satisfy the current regulatory requirements." (citing NATIONAL ACADEMY OF

ENGINEERING, THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 79-80 (1983))).
162 See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006) (Breyer
J., dissenting) (per curiam) (asserting that patents can "discourage research by impeding the free
exchange of information ... by forcing researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by
leading them to conduct costly and time-consuming searches of existing or pending patents, by
requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs of using the patented
information ..
"); Brief for PRMA, supra note 1, at 14 (stating that the safe harbor provision
affects the cost of new drugs because "[a]s the development process becomes more protracted,
therefore, the overall cost of drug development is increased."); Mireles, supra note 10, at 152 (stating
that exclusive patent rights allow patent holders to "increase a patented invention's price beyond
the competitive market price .... ").
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interest in the rapid entry of low-cost drugs and the rights of research tool patent
holders in favor of patentees.

1. PharmaceuticalCompanies that Utilize Research Tools for FDA Regulatory
Testing Face UncertaintyandIncreased Costs
The Federal Circuit's narrow construction of the first prong of safe harbor
provision may increase costs and cause more uncertainty for pharmaceutical
companies because the use of research tools for FDA regulatory approval may not be
given safe harbor. 163 After Proveris, pharmaceutical companies that use patented
research tools have four options: (1) make, use, and sell a non-infringing product; (2)
disregard the patent and risk a finding of patent infringement in subsequent
litigation; (3) obtain a license from the patent holder; or (4) obtain a license and
subsequently challenge the validity of the patent through a declaratory judgment
suit.

16 4

Each of these four options increases overhead for pharmaceutical companies.
Time, money, and resources will have to be allocated to producing non-infringing
research tools. 165 Additionally, without a proper license, pharmaceutical companies
risk costly litigation and the imposition of monetary damages for infringement of
patented research tools. 166 Alternatively obtaining licenses for patented research
167
tools will also lead to increased overhead.
163 So Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 127 (Breyer J., dissenting) (per curiam) (stating that patents
can "discourage research by impeding the free exchange of information.., by forcing researchers to
avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by leading them to conduct costly and time-consuming
searches of existing or pending patents, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by
raising the costs of using the patented information .. ");Brief for PRMA, supra note 1, at 14
(stating that the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision affects the cost of new drugs because "[a]s
the development process becomes more protracted, therefore, the overall cost of drug development is
increased."); Mireles, supra note 10, at 152 (stating that exclusive patent rights allow patent holders
to "increase a patented invention's price beyond the competitive market price ....").
104 Soo Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158-59 (6th Cir.
1978) (identifying a competitor's options when a patent has been issued).
165 See Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing that
the defendant in a patent infringement suit took over four months to produce a non-infringing
product, hired consultants to "consider the impact and effectiveness of the new designs," hired a firm
to "consider 'alternative designs,"' and retained a Ph.D in the field of the invention.").
166So 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (providing the court with the ability to award damages of lost
profits or reasonable royalty fees to compensate for infringement); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497
F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) ([T]o establish willful infringement, a patentee must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood
that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent."); Christopher A. Harkins, Tesla,

Marcon, and the Great Radio Controversy." Awarding Patent Damages Without Chilling a
Defendant's Incentive to Innovate, 73 Mo. L. REV. 745, 766-67 (2008) (discussing the

"substantial cost of litigation" and the risk of patent litigation).
167

See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (providing that a patentee has the right to exclude others from

making, using, offering to sell, or selling the invention in the United States); Combined Petition for
Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of Defendant-Appellant Merck KGaA at 1-3, Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KgaA, Nos. 02-1052, 02-1065, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26547 (Fed. Cir.
Dec. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Combined Petition] (asserting that limiting the scope of the section
271(e)(1) safe harbor provision "will increase the number of licenses needed and create additional
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The options faced by pharmaceutical companies after Proveris will raise the
costs of research and development programs for new drugs. 168 Pharmaceutical
companies will likely pass the increased costs associated with litigation and licensing
to consumers. 169 This is contrary to the two-fold purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act:
(1) to encourage research and development of safe and effective drugs and (2) to
170
provide for the expedited introduction of low-cost drugs into the market place.
The Proveris test weakened the rights of pharmaceutical companies that use
patented research tools for regulatory review, and strengthened the rights of
1 71
research tool patent holders.

2. Proveris StrengthensReseareh Tool PatentHolder Rights

Elimination of research tools from protection under the safe harbor provision
provides strong patent protection for research tool technology and encourages
innovation.17 2 Inventive efforts are stimulated through financial incentives, such as
litigation risks and uncertainties."); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998) (focusing on
the undesirable result that occurs when "a user needs to access multiple patented inputs to create a
single useful product," and compares such patents to a "tollbooth on the road to product
development, adding to the cost and slowing the pace of downstream biomedical innovation.");
Mueller, supra note 12, at 11-12 (noting that the complexity of biomedical research requires access
to a great number of patented research tools).
168 Brief for PRMVIA, supra note 1, at 14 (arguing that the safe harbor provision directly impacts
the cost of drug development because "[a]s the development process becomes more protracted, the
overall cost of drug development is increased").
169 See id. (arguing that the safe harbor provision directly impacts the cost of drug development
because "[a]s the development process becomes more protracted, the overall cost of drug
development is increased"); Stephen R. Lantham, PharmaceuticalCosts.*An Overview andAnalysis
of Legal and Policy Responses by the States, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 141, 173 (2003) (discussing that
drug-cost inflation is driven by advances in technology and that Americans will have to choose
between paying to provide incentives for the development of new and more costly drugs or deciding
that access to current technologies is sufficient); Mireles, supra note 10, at 152 (stating that
exclusive patent rights allows the patent holder to "increase a patented invention's price beyond the
competitive market price .... ").
170 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14-15 (1984) (stating that the purpose of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act is to make more low cost generic drugs available, to
create incentives for increased expenditures on research and development of products subject to
FDA regulatory approval, and to exempt drug makers from patent infringement for testing done in
preparation for seeking FDA approval).
171See Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1265-66 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (eliminating safe harbor protection for alleged infringers using "patented inventions" that do
not qualify as "products" under the patent term extension provision).
172 Brief of Amici Curiae Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, et al. in Support of
Respondents at 2, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No. 03-1237),
2005 WL 682088, at *2 ("Given the normal expectation that innovation follows invention, the
corresponding erosion of patent rights that would necessarily accompany an undue expansion of the
safe harbor would also bring with it a lag in innovation."). But see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents
and the Progressof Science: Exclusive Rights andExperimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1031
(1989) ("[T]echnological change has been an extremely important source of economic growth over
time, and that levels of invention are responsive to economic stimuli. But it does not necessarily
follow that patent protection is necessary to preserve adequate economic incentives for invention
and innovation.").

[8:452 2009]

The Precarious State of Research Tools

licensing, to encourage companies to invest in the development of new research
tools.173 Thus, the next generation of research tools could lead to faster research and
development of new drugs. 174 Prior to Proveris, the Federal Circuit expressed
concerns that if research tool patents were immunized under the safe harbor
175
provision, those patent holders' rights would be destroyed.
Biomedical research, however, is cumulative in nature and requires the use of
176
increasing numbers of patented research tools to develop publicly beneficial drugs.
As a result, a research tool "patent thicket" 177 could arise to restrict access to broadly
useful tools that may stifle pharmaceutical companies' research and development
programs or raise the costs of the drug products that make it to market.178 For
example, researchers may be forced to obtain expensive licenses for research tool
patents and may encounter difficulty because patent holders have the right to refuse
licenses on any terms, even if they are not practicing the invention.1 79 Therefore,
173Katherine J. Strandburg, Users As Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U.
COLO. L. REV. 467, 474 (2008) ("Up until now patent discourse has been relatively unanimous in
assuming that inventors of new technology need to recoup their inventive investments through
commercial sales of embodiments of the invention or by licensing the technology to others.").
174 FTC Report, supra note 11, at ch. 3, p. 19-20 (noting that research tools can considerably
reduce the costs and time required for the drug development process); Mireles, supra note 10, at 149
("Research tools are critical to the efficient development of commercial applications, especially
pharmaceutical drugs.").
175Integra -, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ('[E]xpansion of § 271(e)(1) to include the
Scripps Merck activities would effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees owning
biotechnology tool patents.").
176 Mireles, supra note 10, at 148 (asserting that access to a multitude of research tools is
necessary for the development of products that will have a direct impact on public health); Pyrmont
supra note 16, at 386 ("Due to the scientific complexity of biotechnology research, investigators need
access to a higher number of research tools than in other industries.").
177
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 943 (4th ed. 2007) (defining the term "patent thicket" to describe as "areas of
technology crowded with existing patents.").
17sSee Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc. 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006) (Breyer J.,
dissenting) (per curiam) (stating that patents can "discourage research by impeding the free
exchange of information .. by forcing researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by
leading them to conduct costly and time-consuming searches of existing or pending patents, by
requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs of using the patented
information .. ");see also Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and
Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090,
72,092 (final notice Dec. 23, 1999) ("[I]ntellectual property restrictions can stifle the broad
dissemination of new discoveries and limit future avenues of research and product development.");
Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, & A. Jorge Padilla, The Complements Problem Within
StandardSetting.*Assessing the Evidence on Royalty Stacking, 14 B.U. J. SC. & TECH. L. 144, 151
(2008) (citing Thomas D. Kiley, Patents on Random Complementary DNA Fragments, 257 SCIENCE
915 (1992)) ("[B]ecause every step along the way draws another patent application, the path toward
public possession of real benefit is increasingly obscured by dense thickets of intersecting,
overlapping, and cross-blocking patents ....The cumulation of royalty obligations threatens to have
[a stunting] effect in biotechnology."); Mireles, supra note 10, at 148 (noting that increasing numbers
of patented research tools could "retard innovation and the subsequent development of publicly
beneficial commercial applications."); Mueller, supra note 12, at 5-7 (reporting that the increased
patenting activity in biotechnology has increased the difficulty of access and dissemination of
patented research tools).
179 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2006) (providing instruction to the courts not to withhold
infringement remedies because a patentee has refused to license or use any rights to the patent);
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even though the rights of research patent holders are strengthened,180 the public may
ultimately pay the price because of the high transactional costs of obtaining licenses
18 1
during the research and development of new drugs.
This section addressed the ramifications of the Proveriscourt's shift to a narrow
construction of the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision on research tools. The
proposal section of this comment advocates that legislation should be enacted to
modify the safe harbor provision to immunize the use of patented research tools in
FDA regulatory testing. In the alternative, this comment suggests that any patented
invention that is used to develop a product within the scope of the section 156 patent
term extension provision should be protected under the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor
provision.

III. PROPOSAL

The public interest in low-cost drug prices is in direct conflict with the public
18 2
interest in maintaining incentives for creating new research tool technologies.
Commentators have proposed solutions to balance these public interest tensions
through broadening the scope of the experimental use exception to patent
18 4
infringement,1 8 3 establishing compulsory licensing of research tool patents,
Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) ("[S]uch exclusion may be said to
have been of the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any owner
of property to use or not use it, without question of motives."); Combined Petition, supra note 167, at
14 ("It cannot be assumed ... that licenses will be made available at reasonable prices," and that it
is possible for "the patent owner [to] choose[] to license its patent exclusively to one party, or chooses
not to license its patent in order to prevent competition against its own product.").
180 Soo Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1265-66 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (eliminating safe harbor protection for "patented inventions" that do not qualify as "products"
under the patent term extension provision).
181 Soo Brief for PRMA, supra note 1, at 14 (arguing that the safe harbor provision directly
impacts the cost of drug development because '[a]s the development process becomes more
protracted, the overall cost of drug development is increased"); Lantham, supra note 169, at 173
(discussing that drug-cost inflation is driven by advances in technology and that Americans will
have to choose between paying to provide incentives for the development of new and more costly
drugs or deciding that access to current technologies is sufficient); Mireles, supra note 10, at 152
(stating that exclusive patent rights allows the patent holder to "increase a patented invention's
price beyond the competitive market price ....").
182 H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 30 (1984) ("[T]he committee has merely done what the
Congress has traditionally done in the area of intellectual property law; balance the need to
stimulate innovation against the goal of furthering the public interest."); Mylan Pharms., Inc. v.
Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("These provisions of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments 'emerged from Congress' efforts to balance two conflicting policy objectives: to induce
name brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary to research and develop new
drug products, while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those
drugs to market."' (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.D.C. 1990) (Edwards, J.,
dissenting on other grounds))); Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The HatchWaxman Act.* History Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 585 (2003) ("[Tlhe HatchWaxman Act was enacted as a compromise between the competing interests of promoting innovation
and fostering competition in the pharmaceutical industry.").
183 So genorally Eisenberg, supra note 172 (proposing that the experimental use exception
should be broadened to achieve a balance between the "traditional free access" in basic science and
the "proprietary rights" in applied science); Mueller, supra note 12, at 9 (proposing that the
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establishing a "reach-through" royalty,18 5 or establishing research tool patent
pools. IS6 While these suggestions indicate that there is a problem, generally, with
how biomedical research tools fit in the patent system, this comment focuses
specifically on patented research tools with regard to the scope of the section
271(e)(1) safe harbor provision.

A. Public Policy FavorsLegislation Exempting Research Tools Under the Section
271(e)(1) Safe HarborProvision
The Proveris decision departs from Merek's broad construction of the section
271(e)(1) safe harbor provision,18 7 and seemingly tips the balance against low-cost

drugs in the face of the increasing needs of an aging community.188 One solution to
reconcile the inconsistency between Merck and Proverisis congressional modification
of the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision to clearly define the meaning of the
phrase "patented invention." As discussed in the analysis section above, public policy
favors a broad statutory construction of this phrase that is not synonymous with the
narrower phrase "patented product" within the section 156(f) patent term extension
provision.189

Defining the phrase "patented invention" of the safe harbor provision to include
all patented inventions would encompass patented research tools. Alternatively,
Congress could expressly indicate that research tools are patented inventions within
the meaning of the safe harbor provision.
Legislation establishing that patented research tools fall within the scope of the
safe harbor provision will reduce the transactional costs associated with

experimental research exception should be broadened because the increased patenting activity in
biotechnology has increased the difficulty of access and dissemination of patented research tools).
184 Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Pubhlic Get? Experimental Use and the Patent
Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 81, 90 (2004) (proposing a modified compulsory licensing system for
research tool patents that includes "an initial period of complete exclusivity followed by a period of
compulsory licensing.").
185 Mueller, supra note 12, at 9-10 (proposing a "liability rule" that compensates a patent
holder by using "reach-through" royalties).
186 Mireles, supra note 10, at 224-25 (proposing the government facilitate the use of research
tool patent pools to overcome the "Tragedy of the Anticommons" involved in accumulating the
numerous intellectual property rights necessary to create a commercial product).
187 Compare Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1265 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (holding that only "patented invention" within the meaning of the section 156(f) patent term
extension provision will qualify for immunization under the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision),
with Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005) (holding that the section
271(e)(1) provision applies to "all uses of patented inventions").
188 Compare Brief for PRVA, supra note 1, at 14 (stating that the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor
provision affects the cost of new drugs because as the development process becomes more protracted,
the overall cost of drug development is increased), with Lantham, supra note 169, at 146-47 ("If the
drug manufacturers charged only the marginal cost of drug production-the cost of making each new
pill-then they would never recover their research costs ....Manufacturers need to recover their
R&D costs by allocating some of those costs to the price of each pill sold.").
18) H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 29 (1984) (identifying that the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor
provision provides substantial benefits to the government and the general public because it allows
faster market entry of generic drugs that will assist in the reduction of health care costs).
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pharmaceutical research and development programs. 190 This legislation would
ultimately benefit the public through the availability of lower-cost drugs. 191
The safe harbor provision is a limited exemption. 192 Therefore, this legislation
would not frustrate the purpose of the patent system for research tools patent
holders. 193 Research tool patent holders would still be able to enforce their rights
against alleged infringers under the second prong of the safe harbor analysis. Even if
an alleged infringer satisfies the first prong of the Proveris test, the second prong of
the test requires that the activities be "solely for uses reasonably related to the
194
development and submission of information" to the FDA."'
The safe harbor provision does not protect an alleged infringing pharmaceutical
company from all activities with patented research tools. 95 For example, the safe
harbor provision does not protect basic scientific research performed without the
intent to use the invention for development and submission of information to the
196
FDA.
In addition to the restriction found within the language of the section 271(e)(1)
safe harbor provision, there are several situations where a research tool patent
holder is not negatively impacted by this exemption. First, if a research tool is
encompassed into the final drug product, the safe harbor provision only applies until
approval is obtained. 97 Second, pharmaceutical companies will continue to purchase
190 See Mireles, supra note 10, at 152 (noting the costs associated with patent rights in
discoveries).
191See id. ("The potential monopoly power that a patent provides allows the patentee to
increase a patented invention's price beyond the competitive market price, thus reducing the supply
of the patented invention.").
192 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006); Brief of Patients Not Patents, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Neither Party at 8, Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1428), 2007 WL 3308248, at *8 ("The safe harbor is already limited by the
language of the statute to acts 'solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission
of information' to the FDA.").
193 ITntegra 1$ 496 F.3d 1334, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir 2007) (Rader, J. dissenting-in-part and
concurring- in-part) (asserting that the majority decision "poses a danger to the entire research tool
industry" because the court expanded the scope of the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision);
Jntegrn , 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that expanding the section 271(e)(1) safe
harbor provision would destroy the proprietary rights of research tool patent holders).
194 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); Brief of Patients Not Patents, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at 8, Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(No. 07-1428), 2007 WL 3308248, at *8 ("The safe harbor is already limited by the language of the
statute to acts 'solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information'
to the FDA.").
195 Brief of Amici Curiae Genentech, Inc. and Biogen Idec, Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 22,
Merck, 545 U.S. 193 (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 435893, at *22 (noting that even if research tools fall
under the scope of the safe harbor provision, research tool patent holders would be able to enforce
their patents when activities with the patented tools are not "reasonably related" to FDA regulatory
approval).
196 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 205-06 (2005) (articulating that
"basic scientific research" is not "reasonably related" to the FDA regulatory approval process unless
it is performed with "the intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief that the
compound will cause the sort of physiological effect the researcher intends to induce .... ").
197 See Stephen B. Maebius & Harold C. Wegner, Merck v. Integra: The Impact of a Broader
"Safe Harbor"Exemption on Nanobiotechnology,2 NANOTECH. L. & BuS. 254, 257 (2005) (noting
that when a drug is developed that encompasses the claims of a research tool patent, infringement is
actionable after FDA approval is granted).
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complicated research tools that cannot be easily duplicated in-house. 198 Third,
pharmaceutical companies will continue to obtain licenses from research tool patent
holders. One example is when researchers purchase test kits and obtain implied
licenses that cover many research tool patents, including methods. 199 Under these
types of situations, research tool patent holders will continue to receive a commercial
20 0
benefit from their inventions.
Legislation that includes patented research tools within the scope of the section
271(e)(1) safe harbor provision provides an acceptable balance between the public
interest in low-cost drugs and the need to provide incentives to encourage the
continued development of research tools.
An alternative to address concerns
regarding the scope of the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision is a judicial remedy.

B. Extension of the Proveris Test to Include Products that are Inherent to the
Development ofPatentedProducts Within the Meaningof the Section 156(f) Patent
Term Extension Provision
Another solution to reconcile the Proveris decision with Merck, may be to
judicially supplement the first prong of the Proveristest for "patented inventions" to
include all patented inventions that are inherent to the development of "products" as
that term is defined in the section 156(f) patent term extension provision. This
modified test provides broader protection under the safe harbor provision for the use
of patented research tools during research and development of new drugs. This
modified inherency test is in line with the Supreme Court's determination in
20 2
Merck20 1 and furthers the public interest in obtaining low cost-drugs.
This inherency test would include the use of some research tools under the safe
harbor provision. 20 3 For instance, research tools that are encompassed into an end
drug product would be protected products under the safe harbor provision because
they are necessary components to reach the final drug product. 20 4 Therefore, the use
of patented chemical intermediates, similar to those in Bristol-Myers, that are
necessary to develop a drug would be protected under this standard. 20 5 In contrast,
198
Id. (stating that customers will continue to buy products that are too difficult to replicate
regardless of whether they "believed they could avoid infringement if they made it themselves in
house.").
199Combined Petition, supra note 167, at 15 n.6 ("Many research tool patents, including
methods are embodied in tangible items ... that a researcher must purchase.").
200 Id.
201Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005) (reaffirming the Eli
Lilly holding that defined "patented invention" to include "all uses of patented inventions that are
reasonably related to the development and submission of anyinformation under the FDCA.").
202 H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 29 (1984) (identifying that the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor
provision provides substantial benefits to the government and the general public because it allows
faster market entry of generic drugs that will assist in the reduction of health care costs).
203 See In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Cont'l Can Co. v. Monsanto
Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268, (Fed. Cir. 1991)) (stating that "to establish inherency with regard to
anticipation, the extrinsic evidence 'must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is
necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by
persons of ordinary skill."').
204 See id.
205 Id.
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research tools used merely to test or confirm the activity of a potential drug product,
20 6
such as safety profiling assays, would not qualify as drug products under this test.
Supplementing the first prong of the Proveris test to include an inherency
standard would not completely eliminate the uncertainty of licensing agreements or
potential litigation between pharmaceutical companies and research tool patent
holders, but it would provide immunization for the use of research tools that are
necessary components of drug development under the safe harbor provision. 20 7 Thus,
the public interest in low-cost drugs would be protected to some extent in comparison
to the current test that eliminates research tools from protection under the safe
harbor provision.

CONCLUSION

The Proveris decision narrowed the scope of the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor
provision, and excludes the use of certain patented research tools that are necessary
for pharmaceutical companies to conduct timely and efficient research and
development of new drugs. 208 This decision's effect on research tools may negatively
impact the public by raising the cost of pharmaceutical companies' research and
development programs and may ultimately raise the costs of drugs available to the
public. 20 9 Congress should balance the conflict between the public interest in lowcost drugs and the public interest in maintaining incentives that will encourage the
innovation of new research tool technologies. This comment proposes that legislation
is necessary to include research tools within the scope of the safe harbor provision.
In the alternative, this comment proposes that the Proveris test be judicially
supplemented to include an inherency component protecting the use of patented
research tools that are necessary for drug development.

206 Id. ("Inherency,however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere
fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient."). This
inherency standard comports with the Supreme Court's statement that basic scientific research
"performed without the intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief that the compound

will cause the sort of physiological effect the researcher intends to induce" is surely not 'reasonably
related to the development and submission of information' to the FDA." Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 205-06 (2005).
207 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
208 Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1263-66 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(narrowing the safe harbor provision despite its previously broad application of section 271(e)(1));
FTC Report, supra note 11, at ch. 3, p. 19-20 (noting that research tools can considerably reduce the
costs and time required for the drug development process).
20) Brief for PRMA, supra note 1, at 14 (arguing that the safe harbor provision directly impacts
the cost of drug development because "[a]s the development process becomes more protracted, the
overall cost of drug development is increased"); Lantham, supra note 169, at 173 (discussing that
drug-cost inflation is driven by advances in technology and that Americans will have to choose
between paying to provide incentives for the development of new and more costly drugs or deciding
that access to current technologies is sufficient); Mireles, supra note 10, at 152 (stating that
exclusive patent rights allows the patent holder to "increase a patented invention's price beyond the
competitive market price ....").

